The Cognitive Significance of Reidian Epistemology of Trust in Relation to Social Entrepreneurship

Abstract

This study examines the applicability of Thomas Reid’s epistemology of trust and the cognitive significance in connection to social entrepreneurship. It makes the case that Thomas Reid’s epistemology of trust is not an epistemic component, but a strategic asset in creating sustainable, community-focused social change. In its pre-paradigmatic condition, social entrepreneurship lacks a well-established epistemology. A social entrepreneur recognizes a social problem and uses entrepreneurial principles to organize, create, and manage a venture to achieve social change. The study makes the claim that epistemic trust is necessary for entrepreneurial activity. According to Thomas Reid, trust is not something that needs to be defended; rather, it is a fundamental common-sense belief that is rational in and of itself. He makes a distinction between the various kinds of evidence produced by our faculties, including memory (trusting our past), consciousness (trusting our present mental states), and sense (trusting perception). Through a review of the literature, the study uses a qualitative approach to investigate the applicability of Thomas Reid's epistemology of trust to social entrepreneurship. The study argues that while previous incentives to support entrepreneurship should be preserved, policymakers should also focus on the importance of trust that is developed through unofficial networks.